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The potential spread of highly pathogenic avian
influenza virus via dynamic contacts between
poultry premises in Great Britain
Jennifer E Dent1,5*, Istvan Z Kiss3, Rowland R Kao4 and Mark Arnold2
Abstract
Background: Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses have had devastating effects on poultry industries
worldwide, and there is concern about the potential for HPAI outbreaks in the poultry industry in Great Britain
(GB). Critical to the potential for HPAI to spread between poultry premises are the connections made between
farms by movements related to human activity. Movement records of catching teams and slaughterhouse vehicles
were obtained from a large catching company, and these data were used in a simulation model of HPAI spread
between farms serviced by the catching company, and surrounding (geographic) areas. The spread of HPAI
through real-time movements was modelled, with the addition of spread via company personnel and local
transmission.
Results: The model predicted that although large outbreaks are rare, they may occur, with long distances between
infected premises. Final outbreak size was most sensitive to the probability of spread via slaughterhouse-linked
movements whereas the probability of onward spread beyond an index premises was most sensitive to the
frequency of company personnel movements.
Conclusions: Results obtained from this study show that, whilst there is the possibility that HPAI virus will jump
from one cluster of farms to another, movements made by catching teams connected fewer poultry premises in
an outbreak situation than slaughterhouses and company personnel. The potential connection of a large number
of infected farms, however, highlights the importance of retaining up-to-date data on poultry premises so that
control measures can be effectively prioritised in an outbreak situation.
Background
For a wide range of epidemic infections, contact struc-
tures can be used to describe the potential transmission
of infection in a population [1-4]. The validity of such
models, however, depends on the parameterisation of
the contact structures analysed. The existence of the
animal movement licensing scheme and cattle tracing
system in Great Britain (GB), for which the identifica-
tion and movements of cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, deer
and horses, must be recorded [5], allows for the recon-
struction and analysis of the network of contacts in
order to predict the spread of infectious disease across
these industries. This is not the case for the poultry
industry where, before 2005, there was no national reg-
ister of poultry farms. Motivated by numerous outbreaks
of H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI)
across the world and the occurrence of several incur-
sions of avian influenza viruses (AIV) in GB [6,7], infor-
mation was collected by the British government on
poultry farm locations, and on the frequency and types
of movements between farms.
In GB, the poultry industry can be divided into the
primary breeding sector and the production sector. The
biosecurity levels in the primary breeding sector are
considered to be consistently high, making the probabil-
ity of introduction of pathogens into this sector extre-
mely low. In the production sector, birds are purchased
from a primary breeding company when they are one
day old. Birds then remain on specialist rearing farms
until approximately eighteen weeks of age before they
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are moved to production farms or to hatcheries. Before
meat birds enter the food chain, a catching company
may be brought in to assist in the catching of birds to
be sent to slaughter. Some catching companies may
operate on multiple independently owned farms, and
some farms may not use a catching company at all,
choosing to send birds directly to the slaughterhouse.
Vehicles used to transport birds between farms and
slaughterhouses are often owned by the slaughterhouse
and therefore may act as a link between different pro-
duction farms. Partly due to the increase in the number
and types of movements made on to and off production
farms and partly due to increased exposure of birds to
the environment in the production sector, it is here
where diseases such as AIV have the opportunity to
enter a farm, rendering the production sector the focus
of this study.
It has already been shown that AIVs have the poten-
tial to be spread to a large number of poultry premises
via movement of humans and fomites [8,9]. Company
personnel, feed lorries, egg collectors, slaughterhouse
and catching company personnel (and equipment) have
been identified as contact mechanisms between farms,
over which disease may transmit [10]. It has also been
shown [10] that up to 97%, 42% and 11% of premises
associated with slaughterhouses, catching companies
and multi-site companies, respectively, are connected.
However, this result was reached on the assumption
that all premises using the same slaughterhouse, catch-
ing company or belonging to the same multi-site com-
pany are all potentially connected, with all links being
undirected. While most models assume that all poten-
tially infectious connections are always “active” (though
see also [1]), in practice there are other factors that will
limit the dissemination of disease across the commercial
poultry industry. First, over the time that a premises
might be expected to be able to transfer infection to
other premises, the number of actual connections will
depend on the frequency at which the contacts are
made. Furthermore, there are likely to be important dis-
tance constraints on how far people, vehicles and live-
stock will travel between premises. Therefore the range
over which infection is likely to travel via these means
will be limited (although there is currently no maximum
journey time for poultry [11]). Also, for catching compa-
nies and company personnel, it is possible that there are
regional divisions within the company, e.g. geographical
sub-divisions within multi-site companies and area-
based teams for catching companies, and this has not
previously been considered in models of HPAI transmis-
sion in GB. Therefore, obtaining detailed data on catch-
ing company and slaughterhouse movements for
simulation modelling of HPAI in GB has been high-
lighted as necessary for realistic modelling of HPAI
transmission [10]. The objective of this study was to col-
lect detailed movement data from a large catching com-
pany and to further explore the potential for HPAI to
spread via the routes highlighted.
Based on these new data, an individual farm-based
transmission model was developed where nodes are
poultry premises with links representing potential trans-
mission routes between premises. Although the static
approach (assuming all links between farms are poten-
tially active) that we have previously adopted [10] was
appropriate in the absence of detailed link data, the nat-
ure of these newly collated data enables us to use a
dynamic network model, as is standard practice in dis-
ease modelling [2,12], to determine if the frequency and
size (distance travelled) of movements between farms is
of such a nature as to reduce the concern for a large
HPAI epidemic in GB. In this updated model, the pre-
sence of links between premises is drawn from the col-
lected movement data. This model also incorporates
link directionality allowing for a more realistic and accu-
rate model. Here, the potential for an HPAI epidemic is
determined by considering the results of the individual-
based transmission model.
Methods
Data sources
Movement data from a major catching company were
obtained for all movements made over the 32 month
period between 02/01/2005 and 11/08/2007. These data
contain the times, dates and premises details for
approximately 55,500 movements associated with 68
catching teams (within the company) over 415 poultry
premises in GB. The premises associated with this
catching company are distributed across GB, as shown
in Figure 1. Given that if a premises is visited by a
catching team, then there must be a movement on the
same day between the premises and a slaughterhouse,
these movement data also include movements of birds
from premises to slaughter.
Population data on all commercial poultry premises
housing 50 or more birds, and within 15 km of farms
visited by teams belonging to the catching company,
were taken in November 2007 from an extract of the
GB Poultry Register (GBPR), provided by the Depart-
ment for environment, food and rural affairs (Defra).
The addition of these premises allowed us to consider
disease transmission that can occur between premises
that are in close spatial proximity, enabling us to con-
sider how likely infection is to jump from the network
of premises for which we have movement data to
another network of premises for which no movement
data were available for analysis. The addition of these
premises brought the number of premises studied up to
10,692. The total number of premises recorded in the
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GBPR extract studied was 24,075. Although the total
number of premises serviced by the catching company
is small (approximately 2% of all premises in the GBPR),
by comparing the number of premises serviced by the
catching company with the number of premises known
to be associated with the largest catching companies in
England and Wales, we estimate that between 30% and
50% of premises serviced by a major contracted catching
company are accounted for in this dataset [13 and
unpublished data]. No data were available for small,
independent catching companies.
Premises in the catching company database were
matched to premises in the GBPR so that the model
could be parameterised using location, premises
population size and species data. Temporal aspects were
accounted for by preserving the order in which poultry
premises were visited by individual catching teams on a
daily basis. Additional information on which premises
belong to integrated companies was obtained from a
sample survey of integrated companies.
In the absence of quantitative movement data of com-
pany personnel for the farms studied, we sought expert
opinion [P. Mcmullin, Poultry Health Services, pers.
comm.] to inform the model of the likely frequency of
movements of personnel between farms, based on spe-
cies type, farm size and distance between farms belong-
ing to the same company. The probability of companies
using staff on multiple farms was estimated as well as
the estimated frequency of visits of veterinary officials
and area managers to poultry premises (Table 1).
Descriptive analysis
A descriptive analysis of the collected data is given in
Additional File 1. This analysis was used to identify any
trends in the data that could have important implica-
tions for disease transmission. In particular we consid-
ered how far catching teams and slaughterhouse
vehicles travelled between premises, as it was shown in
[10] that this had a large impact on the potential size of
an HPAI outbreak. The frequency of catching team
movements to premises, dependent on farm size, was
also considered in order to determine if premises size
should be recorded as an output of the simulation
model.
Simulation model (see also Additional File 2)
A stochastic simulation model at the farm level was
developed where farms were classed as susceptible,
infected, detected or culled. HPAI could be transmitted
between premises in close spatial proximity or through
contact via catching teams, slaughterhouse vehicles or
personnel movements within an integrated (multi-site)
company. A random number generator chooses a pre-
mises in the network to infect and a random date of
infection (within the 886 days covered by the catching
company data set). If the seed farm was not visited
within 15 days of this time point, assumed to be the
maximum time that HPAI would survive in the farm
environment, then transmission will be limited to local
spread, often resulting in little or no onward transmis-
sion from the seed premises. When transmission beyond
the seed premises did occur, outbreaks were allowed to
run their course.
We assumed a time step of one day in the model, so
that for each day of the simulation, once a premises had
become infected, we assumed silent spread up to the
time of detection. Detection and culling dates were set
within the model at time of infection and were
Figure 1 Distribution of catching company farms in GB. Map to
show the distribution of poultry premises associated with the
catching company studied. Each point represents a poultry farm.
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dependent on whether the infected premises was in a
protection zone (PZ), a surveillance zone (SZ), or
neither, as described below.
On detection of notifiable HPAI in poultry, 10 km SZs
and 3 km PZs are typically set up around infected pre-
mises. In the model, we assumed no transmission within
the PZ/SZ via the normal movement of catching compa-
nies or slaughterhouse equipment since all movements
in those zones would be monitored. Therefore, spread
would only continue within the PZ/SZ via local spread.
Time to detection within an infected flock was assumed
to occur between 2 and 6 days (mean at 4 days) after
infection [14-18], with the mean reduced to 3 days for
flocks within a PZ or SZ. Culling occurs at the end of
an epidemic day. Using the time taken to cull birds in
the most recent outbreak of HPAI H5N1 in GB [19], we
assumed that culling was completed on infected farms
within 3 days of detection. One hundred simulations
were run for a range of parameter values (Table 1). Up
to 1,000 simulations were run for a subset of parameter
combinations with no qualitative change in the results.
For each simulation, the times at which each farm had
become infected and the times at which their state
changed from infected to detected and from detected to
culled was recorded.
Catching team and slaughterhouse movements
When a movement occurred between infected and sus-
ceptible farms, infection was spread between farms with
probability relating to the type of movement made.
Where multiple species were held on one farm, we
assumed that catching teams catch, on average, one spe-
cies per visit with probability defined in Table 1. This
species became infected with probability of transmission
via catching team. If a susceptible farm had multiple
links from an infected premises, then each link was trea-
ted independently, and the probability of infection there-
fore increased. We assumed that catching team and
slaughterhouse vehicles do not remain infectious over-
night, as we assume that effective decontamination pro-
cedures were in place. A premises was designated as
infected if one or more species on the premises was
infected.
Company (personnel) movements
We assume that spread of infection between farms
belonging to the same multi-site, integrated company
could occur either via the movements of area managers
or veterinary officials between premises, or via staff
working on multiple farms. Movements of veterinary
officials, of area managers and of company personnel
were simulated on a per day basis by using farm size
and distance between farms belonging to the same
multi-site company to identify using parameters in
Table 1 if a) two premises are to be visited on the same
day by the same person and, b) if the link made between
premises will result in transmission of disease. The
model assumes independence between days so that the
last time a premises was visited is not accounted for.
Local (spatial) spread (see Additional Files 2 and 3)
Based on expert opinion, we assume spatial (primarily
airborne) spread in GB is likely to occur with small prob-
ability (p ≤ 0.01) and only for distances up to a maximum
0.5 km [D. Alexander, R. Irvine pers. comm.], according
to the density kernel that is given in Equation 1.
For dist < 0.5 km:
p(trans|dist) = 0.01
[(
1 − dist
/
0.5
) 2]2
(1)
Table 1 Model parameters
Parameter Value Source
Incubation period Up to 1 day (shedding after 8 hours, death
after one day)
I. Brown (pers. comm); [14,15]
Survival of virus on seed premises Up to15 days [16]
Probability of staff working on multiple premises
(Farm size)
0.45 (< 50,000 birds)
0.1 (50,000 to 200,000 birds)
0 (> 200,000 birds)
P. McMullin (pers. comm)
Distance travelled by staff between premises Up to 35 km P McMullin (pers. comm.)
Frequency of vet visits Every 50 days P. McMullin (pers. comm)
Frequency of manager visits Every 10 days (non-layer farms)
Every 50 days (layer farms)
P. McMullin (pers. comm)
Probability catching team catches species (multi
species farms only)
0.7 Chicken
0.12 Turkey
0.16 Duck/goose
0.01 Other
Calculated from catching company data, where
species type available
Probability of catching team, slaughterhouse
and owner transmission
0 to 0.2, in steps of 0.01, with additional
parameter at 0.001 added.
N/A
Time to detection 2 to 6 days (15 days later for ducks/geese) Extrapolation from [15-17]
Parameter values for the network simulation model of avian influenza transmission in Great Britain
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Else p(trans|dist) = 0
A sensitivity analysis of the model to the assumption
that airborne spread could occur is given in Additional
File 3.
Analysis of simulation output
We first consider the proportion of outbreaks that
resulted in onward spread beyond the seed case. Here,
the results follow a linear trend and, as the outcome is a
binary variable (essentially secondary spread, or no sec-
ondary spread) dependent on explanatory variables that
can be categorised into multiple levels, the analysis
lends itself to a logistic regression. Thus a binary logistic
regression was done (using Minitab v16) on the propor-
tion of outbreaks that resulted in onward spread beyond
the seed case. We next consider final epidemic size. In
order to determine how the different types of transmis-
sion affect the epidemic size, two logistic regression
models were fitted (Minitab v16). In the first, the binary
response variable describes whether a small (< 25 pre-
mises) epidemic occurs or not. In the second, the binary
response variable describes whether a large (> 65 pre-
mises) epidemic occurs or not. In both cases, the expla-
natory variables are the simulated transmission
probabilities for AIV transmission via catching company,
slaughterhouse- and owner-related movements.
Results
Additional File 1 gives a data summary and descriptive
analysis of the catching company data. The key points
of this analysis are given below:
1. When the frequency of movements is not
accounted for, slaughterhouse related movements
connected 94% of premises, catching team move-
ments connected 76% of premises and owner move-
ments 11% of premises that are associated with the
catching company. However, when time is consid-
ered, catching teams connect only 2 premises per
day and slaughterhouses an average of 3 premises
per day.
2. Contrary to expectations, the data presented show
that premises do use multiple slaughterhouses and
are associated with multiple catching teams within
the same company (consecutively over the time per-
iod studied). There is no overlap between poultry
companies (i.e. poultry premises are associated with
only one poultry company).
3. There is an increase in frequency of visits to lar-
ger premises, implying that these premises will be at
a higher risk of infection should infection be trans-
mitted by catching team or slaughterhouse vehicles/
equipment.
4. Slaughterhouse vehicles and catching teams travel
long distances between premises, with 72% of move-
ments between premises exceeding 10 km in length.
Simulation modelling
One hundred simulations were run for a total of 10,648
scenarios. Each scenario represents a different combina-
tion of transmission values for each of the transmission
routes studied. In particular, each scenario was created
by ranging parameters from 0 to 0.2, in a step-wise fash-
ion, such that each parameter took on one of 22 possi-
ble values within this range, giving rise to 223 = 10,648
scenarios.
Proportion of positive epidemics spread beyond the
index case
The aims of the simulation model are to determine if a
large outbreak of AIV is possible in the poultry industry
in GB and, if so, what might cause a large outbreak to
occur. One way of answering the first question is to
consider how often infection spreads beyond the seed
premises. That is to ask “how many simulated outbreaks
result in secondary spread?”
When all scenarios and all simulation results are con-
sidered together, infection spread beyond the seed pre-
mises in approximately 15% of the simulations run
(mean value over all simulations and all scenarios). Fig-
ure 2 shows how the distribution of infections that
result in secondary spread varies as the probability of
AIV transmission is increased. For this, the probability
of transmission was calculated by combining the prob-
ability of transmission via catching team, slaughterhouse
and company personnel, as shown in Equation 2.
P(i Infected) = 1 − (
3∏
j−1
(1 − pj)) (2)
for pj probability of infection for via link type j.
Infection resulted in secondary spread (beyond the
seed premises) in up to 35% of scenarios. The simula-
tion that gave the maximum number of cases that
spread beyond the seed premises was from the following
scenario: catching team (cc) = 0.04, company personnel
(owner) = 0.19 and slaughterhouse (sh) = 0.13. This sug-
gests that high probabilities of transmission are not
necessary in all three potential transmission routes for
infection to (relatively) frequently spread beyond the
index case.
Results from a logistic regression analysis are shown
in Tables 2, 3 and 4. Consider the odds ratios in Tables
2, 3 and 4. The results show that transmission via the
movement of catching teams does not have a significant
effect on the probability that an outbreak will result in
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secondary spread. However, movements related to com-
pany personal appear to be significant at all levels, with
the exception of transmission set to p = 0.001. Move-
ments related to slaughterhouse vehicles are significant
in the probability that an outbreak will result in onward
spread only when the probability of transmission is high
enough (here, the model predicts a rate of > 0.06 for a
significant effect to be seen). Further, the odds ratios
also tell us that, under the assumptions made, as the
rate of transmission increases for owner movements in
particular, the effect on the probability of secondary
spread is increasingly large, with the odds ratio rising to
2.11 (2.03, 2.19 (95% CIs)) for a transmission rate of
0.14 compared to zero. This suggests that the probabil-
ity of secondary spread beyond the seed premises is not
uniformly affected by transmission rates across the dif-
ferent link types. This is driven by the characteristics of
the networks over which disease can spread.
Figure 2 The proportion of outbreaks that spread beyond the seed premises for all simulation results. Boxplots to show the median,
quartiles and outer points of the proportion of outbreaks (over 100 simulations) that spread beyond the seed premises, for increasing rates of
transmission. Here, transmission is recorded as the combined risk of AIV transmission over all routes, according to Equation 2.
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In order to visualise the effect that the interaction of
different transmission routes can have on the results,
each potential transmission route was considered on
its own as well as in combination with one or more
other potential routes of transmission. Figure 3 shows
boxplots that describe the proportion of outbreaks that
result in onward spread for different scenarios. The
figure shows that a higher proportion of outbreaks
occur for transmission via owner-related (gp2) move-
ments than for catching company (gp1) or slaughter-
house-related (gp3) movements. It appears that adding
catching company transmission to either transmission
via slaughterhouse- or owner-related movements (gp5
and gp6, respectively) has little impact on the propor-
tion of outbreaks that would result in secondary spread
if the main effects were considered alone. However, the
combination of slaughterhouse- and owner-related
movements (gp4) suggests that this combination can
result in a large proportion of outbreaks resulting in
secondary spread. Finally, it is interesting to note that
Figure 3 also shows that when all three transmission
routes (cc, sh and owner) are greater than zero, a large
proportion of outbreaks can result in onward spread
(gp7).
The statistical significance of interaction terms can be
determined by refitting the logistic regression model,
with interaction terms included. As the model did not
converge when all tested transmission rates were consid-
ered as a single level, in order to consider the potential
interaction between different networks the data were
categorised into “high”, “medium” and “low” probabil-
ities of transmission and the model refitted (see Addi-
tional File 4 Table S1). Although the results (Additional
File 4 Table S1) show that only medium and high levels
of owner transmission have a significant effect on the
results, for all levels of owner/slaughterhouse interac-
tion, there was a significant difference between the
results from this interaction, compared to zero. This
implies that whilst slaughterhouse transmission alone is
not enough for an outbreak to result in secondary
spread, the combination of owner and slaughterhouse
related movements has a significant effect on the prob-
ability that an outbreak results in secondary spread,
even for low levels of transmission of disease. The
results from Additional File 4 Table S1 also show that
there is no significant interaction effect from the catch-
ing company - owner interaction or from the catching
company - slaughterhouse interaction (the confidence
Table 2 Binary logistic regression, with odds ratios
calculated for the probability of secondary spread versus
catching company transmission rates
Transmission
rate
Odds
Ratio
Lower
95% CI
Upper
95% CI
p-value
0.001 0.97 0.93 1 0.064
0.01 1 0.97 1.04 0.813
0.02 0.95 0.92 0.98 0.005
0.03 0.97 0.94 1.01 0.14
0.04 1.02 0.98 1.06 0.303
0.05 0.96 0.93 0.99 0.024
0.06 0.96 0.93 1 0.043
0.07 0.99 0.95 1.02 0.451
0.08 0.96 0.93 1 0.038
0.09 0.95 0.92 0.99 0.011
0.1 0.97 0.94 1.01 0.124
0.11 0.98 0.94 1.01 0.23
0.12 0.99 0.96 1.03 0.677
0.13 1 0.97 1.04 0.906
0.14 0.98 0.94 1.01 0.187
0.15 0.98 0.95 1.02 0.267
0.16 0.96 0.92 0.99 0.018
0.17 1 0.96 1.03 0.871
0.18 0.98 0.95 1.02 0.313
0.19 0.96 0.93 1 0.047
0.2 0.98 0.95 1.02 0.359
Table 3 Binary logistic regression, with odds ratios
calculated for the probability of secondary spread versus
owner transmission rates
Transmission rate Odds Ratio Lower
95% CI
Upper
95% CI
p-value
0.001 0.98 0.94 1.03 0.488
0.01 1.09 1.04 1.14 0
0.02 1.19 1.14 1.24 0
0.03 1.27 1.22 1.33 0
0.04 1.38 1.33 1.44 0
0.05 1.42 1.37 1.48 0
0.06 1.47 1.41 1.53 0
0.07 1.53 1.47 1.59 0
0.08 1.66 1.59 1.72 0
0.09 1.74 1.67 1.81 0
0.1 1.75 1.69 1.83 0
0.11 1.86 1.79 1.94 0
0.12 1.97 1.89 2.04 0
0.13 1.94 1.87 2.02 0
0.14 2.11 2.03 2.19 0
0.15 2.09 2.01 2.17 0
0.16 2.19 2.11 2.27 0
0.17 2.24 2.16 2.33 0
0.18 2.33 2.24 2.42 0
0.19 2.38 2.29 2.47 0
0.2 2.38 2.29 2.47 0
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intervals on all odds ratio include zero). This means
that, in theory, catching company transmission can be
dropped from the model. With catching company
removed from the results and the regression rerun, the
final logistic regression results are given in Table 5.
Epidemic size
In this part of the analysis, only epidemics that result in
spread beyond the seed premises are considered. This
accounts for approximately 15% of all simulation results.
For all results, there were no epidemics of size
between 23 and 66 premises (see Figure 4). The number
of large epidemics, which we consider here to involve
more than 65 infected premises (those epidemics in Fig-
ure 4b), is small, representing 0.2% of all results. How-
ever, these are the epidemics that are likely to cause the
most strain on resources in an outbreak situation, so it
is important to determine from the data if the rate of
transmission via different routes, or the index premises
in these epidemics, have any notable characteristics.
There were a total of 330 individual premises that
were included in the set of outbreaks that resulted in
onward spread (~80% of population for which move-
ment data were available). Of these, 95 individual
premises were seed premises in the (249) “large” epi-
demics recorded. All 95 of these premises were also
seed premises in the list of (130939) “small” epidemics.
Premises size (number of birds) was available for 78% of
seed premises for large epidemics, and for 94% of seed
premises for small epidemics. The results (Table 6) sug-
gest that a large epidemic is more likely to occur when
infection is seeded in large premises (37 of 74 “large”
epidemics began in large premises). However, infection
into large premises does not imply a large epidemic will
occur. Interestingly, the mean epidemic size when infec-
tion is seeded in small premises (3.8) is larger than that
of both medium (2.8) and large premises (3.1). This may
be connected to the probability of an outbreak resulting
in spread beyond the seed premises, as owner links have
been shown to be important and owner movements are
more likely to occur in small premises (an immediate
effect of the model assumptions).
In order to determine how the different types of trans-
mission affect the epidemic size, two logistic regression
models were fitted. In the first, the binary response vari-
able describes whether a small (< 25 premises) epidemic
occurs or not. In the second, the binary response vari-
able describes whether a large (> 65 premises) epidemic
occurs or not. In both cases, the explanatory variables
are the simulated transmission probabilities for AIV
transmission via catching company, slaughterhouse- and
owner-related movements. The results are shown in
Additional File 4 Table S2 to S7.
For small epidemics, Additional File 4 Tables S2 to S4
show that catching company movements have a signifi-
cant influence on the results for a range of probability
values between 0.02 and 0.16. Interestingly, when these
results are significant (the odds ratio confidence inter-
vals do not contain zero), the odds ratios show that the
probability of a small epidemic decreases (the odds
ratios are less than 1) with an increase in catching com-
pany transmission rates, when compared to zero. This
suggests that an increase in catching company transmis-
sion might result in a higher proportion of epidemics
being larger. Additional File 4 Table S3 shows that
transmission via owner movements is significant at all
levels above p = 0.001. Above this value, the odds ratios
are all larger than one, implying that increasing the rate
of transmission results in the likelihood of a small epi-
demic occurring to increase. For slaughterhouses (Addi-
tional File 4 Table S4), significant results are obtained
for transmission rates > 0.05. The strength of the signifi-
cance does not increase in proportion with the increase
in transmission, with all transmission rates > 0.12 having
an odds ratio value of between 1.07 and 1.10. These
results therefore suggest that the most influential para-
meter for the probability of a small epidemic to occur is
transmission via owner movements.
Table 4 Binary logistic regression, with odds ratios
calculated for the probability of secondary spread versus
slaughterhouse transmission rates
Transmission
rate
Odds
Ratio
Lower
95% CI
Upper
95% CI
p-value
0.001 0.97 0.93 1.01 0.093
0.01 0.99 0.95 1.02 0.435
0.02 0.99 0.95 1.03 0.597
0.03 1 0.96 1.03 0.861
0.04 1 0.96 1.03 0.824
0.05 1 0.96 1.04 0.927
0.06 1.04 1 1.08 0.036
0.07 1.03 1 1.07 0.068
0.08 1.04 1.01 1.08 0.019
0.09 1.04 1.01 1.08 0.019
0.1 1.05 1.01 1.09 0.012
0.11 1.07 1.03 1.11 0
0.12 1.05 1.01 1.09 0.008
0.13 1.09 1.05 1.13 0
0.14 1.08 1.04 1.12 0
0.15 1.09 1.06 1.13 0
0.16 1.08 1.04 1.12 0
0.17 1.08 1.04 1.12 0
0.18 1.09 1.06 1.13 0
0.19 1.1 1.06 1.14 0
0.2 1.1 1.06 1.14 0
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Additional File 4 Table S5 and S6 show that, contrary
to expectations, neither catching company nor owner
movements play a significant role in the probability that
an outbreak will result in a large epidemic. For large
epidemics, the most influential predictor is the transmis-
sion rate via slaughterhouse linked movemernts (Addi-
tional File 4 Table S7). Analysis of the odds ratios for
slaughterhouse transmission versus large epidemics
shows that this transmission route is only influential if it
is high enough (above 0.12). However, when it is high
enough, the upper 95% limits (for the odds ratios) show
that an increase from zero transmission to a higher
transmission rate will result in a large epidemic being
up to 28 times more likely. This is a very striking result
with heavy implications on resources, for example, in
the event of an outbreak. It is therefore essential to
Figure 3 The proportion of outbreaks that spread beyond the seed premises for different parameter combinations. Boxplots of the
proportion of outbreaks that result in spread beyond the seed premises, for different parameter combinations. gp1 = sh, gp2 = owner, gp3 = cc,
gp4 = owner and sh, gp5 = cc and sh, gp6 = cc and owner, gp7 = cc, owner and sh. Within each group, parameters are varied from 0 to 0.2.
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determine the true probability of transmission via this
route.
Spatial spread
While the majority of outbreaks did not result in further
onward transmission from the index premises, outbreaks
could potentially cover up to 20% of the population (for
a range of parameter values < 0.2) for which network
data were available, covering distances of up to 730 km
between premises (see Additional File 5, Figure S1).
Although for the largest distances to be covered (> 700
km), at least one transmission parameter must be as
high as 0.12, occasionally, distances over 600 km
between premises are reached for transmission para-
meters between zero and 0.07. This has important
implications for the availability of control resources as
the number of premises in the SZs will be greater if dis-
semination of virus is geographically widespread and
therefore potentially involving a larger number of local
disease control centres. Large epidemics invariably
resulted in widespread geographical dissemination of
virus.
In this model, infection can only be spread into pre-
mises that are not serviced by the catching company, by
spatial transmission of disease, to premises within 500
m of infected premises. This results in infection of
premises that are potentially connected to different sub-
networks (via other catching companies, slaughterhouses
or poultry companies for example) in less than 1% of
the simulations run. However, we have seen that trans-
mission via sh-linked movements is an important factor
in determining final epidemic size, and slaughterhouses
that are included in the network studied may also be
used by poultry premises not included here. This
implies that if this route is important, infection may
leak into other sub-networks of the industry much more
frequently.
Discussion
Despite the extent of data previously available on the
British poultry industry, the detailed contact structures
within the poultry industry in GB have only been poorly
understood. Previous studies have been able to identify
potential contact structures but assumptions have had
to be made on the frequency and patterns of move-
ments between farms [10,15,20]. Whilst it is important
to acknowledge that the models presented here rely
heavily on expert opinion (which is arguably a drawback
of such a modelling approach), in the absence of out-
break data for AIV in GB, this cannot be avoided. For
this reason, we have considered many scenarios by vary-
ing parameter values and by combining expert opinion
Table 5 Binary Logistic regression: secondary spread versus transmission rates for interaction between transmission
routes at different levels of transmission
Predictor Coefficient SE Odds Ratio Lower 95% CI Upper 95% CI p-value
Constant -2.16587 0.071836 0
owncat
1 0.004215 0.076562 1 0.86 1.17 0.956
2 0.415397 0.075335 1.51 1.31 1.76 0
3 0.631829 0.074869 1.88 1.62 2.18 0
shcat
1 -0.22299 0.077486 0.8 0.69 0.93 0.004
2 -0.12265 0.077053 0.88 0.76 1.03 0.111
3 -0.0784 0.076875 0.92 0.8 1.07 0.308
owncat*shcat
1*1 0.248773 0.082484 1.28 1.09 1.51 0.003
1*2 0.227419 0.082041 1.26 1.07 1.47 0.006
1*3 0.229411 0.081855 1.26 1.07 1.48 0.005
2*1 0.207304 0.0812 1.23 1.05 1.44 0.011
2*2 0.154659 0.080772 1.17 1 1.37 0.056
2*3 0.140458 0.080593 1.15 0.98 1.35 0.081
3*1 0.228509 0.0807 1.26 1.07 1.47 0.005
3*2 0.174293 0.080272 1.19 1.02 1.39 0.03
3*3 0.15525 0.080095 1.17 1 1.37 0.053
Final model.
Level 1 = low transmission rate 0 - 0.06, level 2 = medium transmission rate 0.07 - 0.13, level 3 = high transmission rate 0.14 - 0.2. sh = slaughterhouse, own =
company personnel. SE = standard error.
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Figure 4 Epidemic size. Histogram of epidemic size for infections resulting in onward spread beyond the seed premises. a) epidemics including
fewer than 25 infected premises and b) epidemics including more than 65 infected premises.
Table 6 Effect of seed premises on outbreak size
Seed premises size Number unique premises in small
epidemics (seed)
Number unique premises in large
epidemics (seed)
Proportion outbreaks resulting in
large epidemics
Small (≤ 100,000 birds) 35 20 0.57
Medium (100,000 -
200,000 birds)
59 17 0.29
Large (> 200,000 birds) 141 37 0.26
The proportion of outbreaks that result in large/small epidemics for different size categories of seed premises.
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with real time movement data from a large catching
company, we have been able to adopt a similar approach
to that used in [1] to investigate the potential spread of
AIV in the GB poultry industry.
The results presented here show that restrictions on
the frequency of movements can have an important role
in determining disease spread risk. In particular, connec-
tions via slaughterhouses can connect a large number of
premises over a large geographical area, important in
the potential for virus dissemination. Spread via slaugh-
terhouse-linked movements is most prominent when
partial flock depopulation is being undertaken at a farm,
as this action results in more premises being visited in
one day and potential infection of birds that remain on
the farm. This is also an important output for the con-
trol of diseases other than HPAI, such as Salmonella or
Campylobacter spp., where the slaughterhouse is a more
likely reservoir for pathogens [21]. We note here that,
whilst slaughterhouses and catching teams are separated
in this study, in some cases one might group the two
transmission routes together under the assumption that
any movement that arises due to a catching team visit-
ing a farm is considered a ‘catching company’ move-
ment. The results are likely to be sensitive to such an
assumption and thus it is important not to misinterpret
them. However, the principles used in this study remain
valid for the potential transmission of diseases spread by
the faeco-oral route, such as Campylobacter spp. and
Salmonella, as well as different strains of HPAI. The
model is well-suited to investigating diseases where
expert opinion does not have to be so heavily relied
upon for model parameterisation (as expert opinion
adds uncertainty to results, resulting in one only being
able to answer ‘what-if’ scenarios, in a situation the
model assumptions may affect interpretation of results).
In Campylobacter research, for example, one would
expect the model results to be quite different due to dif-
ference in epidemiological characteristics of Campylo-
bacter spp. compared to HPAI. With a perceived higher
prevalence of the pathogen, we would expect the results
of the model presented here, applied to Campylobacter
spp. to show that catching company movements are
likely to have a bigger effect on the spread of disease
between farms.
Despite the relatively heavy use of expert opinion to
estimate model parameters in this study - in particular
for the frequency of movements made by company per-
sonnel, we can use the model presented here to
hypothesise about the importance of different types of
potentially infectious links between poultry premises
and we can conclude from these results that, where
slaughterhouses can act as a reservoir for pathogens, the
spread via this route should be minimized. This can be
achieved through additional bio-security measures, such
as thorough cleaning of the crates and vehicles that
carry the birds, for example.
The results that catching team movements have little
effect both on the probability of an outbreak resulting in
onward spread beyond the seed premises and on the
probability of a large epidemic occurring are important
results, as they suggest that the number of farms that a
catching team visits during the infectious period of the
virus is too low to link a high number of farms, in GB,
during an epidemic. For pathogens that can survive for
longer periods in the environment or that are more pre-
valent than HPAI (such as Campylobacter spp.), the
number of farms that can be linked by catching team
movements will be (potentially significantly) higher.
However, while extensive and therefore of value, the
data used here correspond to only one (large) catching
company that is made up of a 68 distinct catching
teams. As each farm may be visited by one or more of
the catching teams, there are no distinct regional divi-
sions apparent within this company as was initially
expected. Further, these data do not consider further
spread once other networks (e.g. connected by slaugh-
terhouses and catching companies) contain infected
premises.
Although all three transmission routes were positive
when a large proportion of (simulated) outbreaks
resulted in spread beyond the seed premises, the fitting
of a regression models suggests that only company per-
sonnel movements significantly influence the probability
that infection will spread beyond the seed premises.
This highlights the importance of obtaining more accu-
rate estimates on the frequency of movements of com-
pany personnel and the probability of transmission via
this route.
There was a significant interaction effect for the own-
er*slaughterhouse interaction on the proportion of out-
breaks that result in onward spread. However, the
combinations of potential transmission of disease via
catching company and company personnel movements,
or slaughterhouse-linked and catching company move-
ments have little effect on the proportion of outbreaks
that result in onward spread, particularly compared to
the individual owner effect. This can be explained by
the frequency of movements relative to premises size
(Additional File 1 Figures S6 to S9), such that the
increased frequency of catching company movements in
particular (and also, but less so for slaughterhouse-
linked movements), to larger premises is not high
enough to force these potential transmission routes to
have a large effect on the proportion of outbreaks that
result in spread beyond the seed premises, compared to
transmission via owner movements. Having highlighted
owner movements as important in previous studies [10]
and given that they can have a large effect on the
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number of outbreaks resulting in an epidemic, it is
recommended that data collection is expanded to
include movement data from an integrated company,
furthering our ability to provide more robust estimates
of epidemic size and likelihood.
The results show that there is a “jump” from epi-
demics of size lower than 23 infected farms (< 5% of
premises), to epidemics containing more that 65
infected farms (~20% of premises). This is in line with
results published by [22], who report that a predictor of
the need to intensify control efforts in GB is whether an
outbreak exceeds 20 infected premises. The results fol-
low the pattern of epidemic outbreak sizes (at least qua-
litatively) as expected for any stochastic epidemic model,
with epidemics either going extinct early, or growing to
reach a substantial proportion of the population. Whilst
this result, which represents a threshold for the basic
reproduction number, R0 , will be affected by the struc-
ture of the networks, investigating network structure
alone is not enough to fully investigate the effect of R0 .
To do this, one would need to understand the effect of
the individual transmission rates on the probability of a
large outbreak.
When comparing the results for small epidemics
against those for large epidemics, two factors that differ
significantly between the two categories are worth not-
ing: the effect of the probability of transmission via
slaughterhouse movements and seed premises size.
Large epidemics are up to 28 times more likely for
higher levels of slaughterhouse transmission (compared
to zero), implying that the characteristics of the network
of slaughterhouse links are maintained even when a
time component and control measures are added, result-
ing in connectivity between a higher proportion of pre-
mises via this route than via any other route. This result
confirms that slaughterhouses are an important factor in
this model. The size of seed premises plays a role here
as there is an increase in frequency of catching team
and slaughterhouse visits to larger premises (Additional
File 1 Figure S10). This results in large outbreaks being
more likely to occur, as a result of infection in a large
seed premises. It is reiterated however that this does not
imply that infection seeded in large premises will always
result in a large outbreak. Nevertheless, this result does
suggests that if premises are to be prioritised during
contact tracing, there will be some benefit to targeting
large premises ahead of smaller ones in a epidemic
situation. Further investigation into all premises
included in these epidemics to identify whether the
same premises are included in the large epidemics is
highlighted here as an area for further research. This
will also identify premises that might be considered par-
ticularly high risk.
We note that all slaughterhouses that appear in the
movement data analysed are recorded as slaughtering
birds from farms that are not visited by the catching
company studied. This implies that the network of pre-
mises studied is not closed; with up to 131 additional
farms sending birds to the same slaughterhouse (unpub-
lished data), the possibility of disease spreading into
other sub-networks within the industry is potentially
high. It is therefore very important to ensure the data
held on slaughterhouses and their customers is both
complete and up to date. This will enable better prioriti-
sation of the potentially large number of premises that
could undergo surveillance in an outbreak situation.
Our results show that the distribution of poultry pre-
mises in GB is not dense enough for airborne transmis-
sion of AIV contribute significantly to between premises
spread amongst premises recorded in the GBPR, so long
as the distance for airborne transmission is less than
500 m. This has not been the case in past outbreaks in
other countries, such as the Netherlands and Italy,
where local spread is likely to have played a role in the
transmission of disease from one farm to another.
Should a virus strain that can easily transmit via air-
borne transmission be modelled, then local spread may
result in spread between premises that have no other
direct connections. For other virus strains, this could
have a large impact on the proportion of outbreaks
resulting in spread beyond the seed premises and the
maximum epidemic size. This implies that there is pos-
sible scope to reduce the size of the 10 km SZs, freeing
resources for use elsewhere. This could be explored
further by using network data currently available to
explore how large a SZ should be, taking into account
resource constraints and simulating over a range of
assumptions regarding transmission rates. The mean
number of premises affected by an epidemic may be
dependent not only on the underlying epidemiological
parameters, but also on the total resources available.
Resource constraints were not included in this model
but the model could be adapted to aid future work in
this area, important for exploring optimal resource allo-
cation in order to provide the most efficient detection of
AIV and the curtailing of the outbreak.
Conclusions
Previous work has shown that large proportions of the
poultry industry are potentially connected by catching
companies and by slaughterhouse [10]. However, such
analyses did not take into account the restriction in the
number of interaction events that could occur over the
course of a typical infectious period. Including these
effects, such as via the explicit spatio-temporal simula-
tions explored in this study, shows that such restrictions
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can have an important role in determining disease
spread risk.
In line with previous work [10], we have shown that
slaughterhouses connect the highest number of premises
in the poultry industry. Furthermore, the potentially
high frequency of company personnel between farms
renders this type of movement more important in the
beginning of an outbreak. Contrary to expectations,
however, the frequency of movements of catching teams
between premises is not high enough to connect large
numbers of premises, reducing the potential for a large
outbreak spread via this route, in GB. The size of seed
premises played a role in final epidemic size suggesting
that there will be some benefit to targeting large pre-
mises ahead of smaller ones in an epidemic situation.
The ability of the virus to jump from one sector of the
industry to another highlights the importance of keeping
data on movements on and off poultry farms both
detailed and up to date.
Additional material
Additional file 1: Descriptive analysis of catching company data.
Additional file 2: Simulation modelling methods and outputs.
Additional file 3: Sensitivity to spatial spread.
Additional file 4: Results - supplementary tables.
Additional file 5: Maximum distance between infected premises.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Defra for funding the project. We also thank Prof
George Gettinby and Dr. Louise Kelly for statistical input at the final stages.
Further, we gratefully acknowledge the following for helpful comments on
the manuscript: Alasdair Cook and Richard Irvine (Animal Health and
Veterinary Laboratories Agency) and Victor Del Rio Vilas (Defra). Finally, we
would like to thank Lucy Snow (Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratories
Agency) for her help with data collection.
Author details
1Department of Mathematics and Statistics, 16 Richmond Street, University
of Strathclyde, Glasgow, G1 1XQ, UK. 2Animal Health and Veterinary
Laboratories Agency, New Haw, Addlestone, Surrey, KT15 3NB, UK.
3Department of Mathematics, Mantell Building, University of Sussex, Falmer,
Brighton, BN1 9RF, UK. 4Faculty of Veterinary Medicine, 464 Bearsden Road,
Glasgow, G61 1QH, UK. 5Clinical Trials Research Unit, University of Leeds,
Leeds, LS2 9JT, UK.
Authors’ contributions
MA designed the study. JED collected the data. JED, RRK and IZK analysed
the data. JED wrote the simulation model. JED wrote the manuscript with
input from MA, RRK and IZK. All authors have read and approved the final
manuscript.
Received: 4 November 2010 Accepted: 13 October 2011
Published: 13 October 2011
References
1. Green DM, Kiss IZ, Kao RR: Modelling the initial spread of foot and mouth
disease through livestock movements. Proc R Soc B 2006, 273:2729-35.
2. Kao RR, Green DM, Johnson J, Kiss IZ: Disease dynamics over very
different time-scales: foot-and-mouth disease and scrapie on the
network of livestock movements in the UK. JR Soc Interface 2007,
4:907-916.
3. Kiss I, Green D, Kao RR: The network of sheep movements within Great
Britain: Network properties and their implications for infectious disease
spread. JR Soc Interface 2006, 3:669-677.
4. Read JM, Keeling MJ: Disease evolution on networks: the role of contact
structure. Proc R Soc Lond B 2003, 270:699-708.
5. Defra: Livestock identification and movements. 2011 [http://www.defra.
gov.uk/food-farm/animals/movements], consulted 06October 2011.
6. Gibbens N: Avian influenza outbreak in Oxfordshire. Vet Rec 2008,
162(24):795.
7. Manvell RJ, Londt BZ, Ceeraz V, Cox WJ, Essen S, Banks J, Slomka MJ,
Pavlidis T, Irvine RM, Wilesmith JW, Sharpe CE, Hurst A, Alexander DJ,
Brown IH: Low pathogenic avian influenza in domestic fowl in Norfolk,
England, March and April, 2006. Vet Rec 2008, 162(9):278-80.
8. Alexander DJ: The epidemiology and control of avian influenza and
Newcastle disease. Comp Pathol 1995, 112(2):105-126.
9. Bahl AK, Langston A, Van Deussen RA, Pomeroy BS, Newman J,
Karunakaran D, Halvorson D: Prevention and control of avian influenza in
turkeys. Proc Annu Meet US Anim Health Assoc 1979, 83:355-363.
10. Dent JE, Kao RR, Kiss IZ, Hyder K, Arnold M: Contact structures in the
poultry industry in Great Britain: Exploring transmission routes for a
potential avian influenza virus epidemic. BMC Veterinary Research 2008,
4:27[http://www.biomedcentral.com/1746-6148/4/27].
11. Defra: Welfare of Animals During Transport.[http://www.defra.gov.uk/food-
farm/animals/welfare/transport/], consulted 11 March 2010.
12. Keeling MJ, Eames KT: Networks and epidemic models. JR Soc Interface
2005, 2(4):295-307.
13. Gittins J, Canning P: Review of the Poultry Catching Industry in England
and Wales. 2006 [http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/
poultycatchreview.pdf], consulted on 06 October 2011.
14. Pantin-Jackwood MJ, Kapczynski DR, Wasilenko JL, Sarmento L: Comparison
of the pathogenicity of different H5N1 HPAI viruses in chickens and
ducks. Proceedings of the American Association of Veterinary Laboratory
Diagnosticians 50th Annual Conference 2007, 125.
15. Sharkey KJ, Bowers RG, Morgan KJ, Robinson SE, Christley RM:
Epidemiological consequences of an incursion of highly pathogenic
avian influenza into the British poultry flock. Proc R Soc B 2007, 275:1630
[http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/275/1630/19.full].
16. Savill NJ, Rose SG, Woolhouse MEJ: Detection of mortality clusters
associated with highly pathogenic avian influenza in poultry: a
theoretical analysis. JR Soc Interface 2008, 5:1049-1419.
17. Stegeman A, Bouma A, Elbers ARW, De Jong MCM, Nodelijk G, De Klerk F,
Koch G, van Boven M: Avian influenza A virus (H7N7) epidemic in The
Netherlands in 2003: Course of the epidemic and effectiveness of
control measures. J Infect Dis 2004, 190(12):20.
18. Yoon H, Park CK, Nam HM, Wee SH: Virus spread pattern within infected
chicken farms using regression model: the 2003-2004 HPAI epidemic in
the republic of Korea. Journal of Veterinary Medicine Series B 2005,
52(10):428-431.
19. Defra: Preliminary epidemiology report: avian influenza outbreak in
Suffolk, November 2007 as at 26 November 2007.[http://archive.defra.gov.
uk/foodfarm/farmanimal/diseases/atoz/ai/documents/ai-prelim-
epireport071129.pdf], consulted 06 October 2011.
20. Garske T, Clarke P, Ghani A: The transmissibility of highly pathogenic
avian influenza in commercial poultry in industrialised countries. PloS
ONE 2007, 2(4):e349.
21. Evans SJ, Sayers AR: A longitudinal study of Campylobacter infection of
broiler flocks in Great Britain. Preventive Veterinary Medicine 2000,
46:209-223.
22. Truscott J, Garske T, Chis-Ster I, Guitian J, Pfeiffer D, Snow L, Wilesmith J,
Ferguson N, Ghani A: Control of a highly pathogenic H5N1 avian
influenza outbreak in the GB poultry flock. Proceedings of the Royal Society
B 2000, 274(1623):2287.
doi:10.1186/1746-6148-7-59
Cite this article as: Dent et al.: The potential spread of highly
pathogenic avian influenza virus via dynamic contacts between poultry
premises in Great Britain. BMC Veterinary Research 2011 7:59.
Dent et al. BMC Veterinary Research 2011, 7:59
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1746-6148/7/59
Page 14 of 14
S1 Additional File 1 - Descriptive analyis of catching company
data.
S1.1 Individual network characteristics
For these data, a connection was assumed between premises if the two premises were visited
on the same day. Under this assumption, over the time period of 936 days, catching teams
connected 317 of the 415 (76%) poultry premises visited. The remaining premises were visited
either as a one off, or were never visited on the same day as other premises, by the same
catching team. Using Tarjan’s algortithm [Sedgewick, 2001] to identify clusters of premises
that are connected by catching teams, a total of 12 disjoint clusters were found, 11 of these 12
clusters contain fewer than 5 poultry premises. This implies that, over the time period studied,
almost 300 premises are connected in at least one direction. In fact, each poultry premises
was connected, by catching teams, to an average of 3.98 other premises over the time period
studied (this figure, which describes the mean degree per poultry premises, excludes self-loops
and counts repeated links only once).
Over the same time period, slaughterhouses connected 391 of the 415 (94 %) poultry premises,
immediately suggesting that this network is better-connected than that of premises linked by
catching team. These data contained 4 clusters (excluding isolated nodes), one containing 383
premises and the remaining three with four or fewer premises. Each premises was connected,
via slaughterhouses, to an average of 15.33 other premises during the time period studied.
The in- and out-degree distributions for premises linked by catching company are given in
Additional File 1 Figure S1. In order to show that the network of premises connected by
catching team is approximately scale free (i.e. is made up of a small number of highly connected
nodes and high number of nodes with a small number of connections), a power-law distribution
was fitted to both in- and out-degree to give the number of nodes, xin and xout, with degree,
d, as shown in Equation (1) (corresponding R2 values for in- and out-degree distributions were
R2
in
= 0.92 and R2
out
= 0.86).
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Figure S1. Degree distribution for premises linked by catching company. In-degree = red,
out-degree = blue. Points represent true data, lines represent fitted power-law.
xin = 95.73x
−1.27, xout = 115.20x
−1.4 (1)
For slaughterhouse linked movements, the in- and out-degree distributions, shown in Additional
File 1 Figure S2, could not be characterised by a power-law distribution (the R2 values for
a fitted power-law distribution were 0.49 and 0.43 for in- and out-degree, respectively). The
slaughterhouse degree distribution showed a distribution that is closer to a Poisson distribution.
However, as the mean and variance are not equal, a Poisson distribution could also not be fitted
to the data. Despite displaying Poisson characteristics, implying the network is random, the
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Figure S2. Degree distribution for premises linked by slaughterhouse. (a) In-degree (red) and (b)
out (blue).
data showed some exponential decay, which implies that the network may be held together by
only few ‘hub’ nodes, with high degree.
S1.2 Frequency of movements per day
If all links between premises associated with the Catching Company are considered at once
(as previously assumed [Dent et al., 2008]) and a per link probability of transmission assumed
between farms that are linked, then links between the same premises on different days be-
come important as they can increase the probability of disease transmission between premises.
However, in reality AIV is not likely to transmit over such an extended time period and so
3
the frequency of movements on a daily basis may be more important to consider than that of
connectivity over a longer time period.
Figure S3. Number of poultry premises visited per catching team per day.
The average number of connections per node for premises connected on the same day is 0.19 for
connections made by catching team movements and 2.53 for slaughterhouse linked movements
(this figure assumes that self-loops -where the same premises is visited multiple times on one
day by the same catching team or slaughterhouse vehicle- are not accounted for). There were a
large number of visits to premises that did not result in onward movements. When an onward
movement did occur, a mean of 1.22 (variance = 0.39) and 3.33 (variance = 9.5) premises were
connected by catching team and slaughterhouse, respectively. Additional File 1 Figures S3 and
S4 show the empirical distributions of data describing how many premises are visited per day
by catching teams and slaughterhouse vehicles, over the full 936-day period.
Additional File 1 Figure S3 shows that in approximately 84% of cases, only one premises is
4
Figure S4. Number of poultry premises visited by slaughterhouse vehicles, per day.
visited by a catching team on a given day, implying that the event that catching teams visit
more than one premises in a day is rare.
Despite the low probability that more than one premises was visited in a day by catching
teams, the data show that up to seven premises were visited in one 24-hour period (see also
Additional File 1 Figure S3), so it is not wise, at this stage, to eliminate this as an important
transmission route between premises. In addition, the data show that only 24% of poultry
premises are serviced by a single catching team, with some premises being visited by up to 30
different catching teams (Additional File 1 Figure S5) within the time period studied. Although
no premises were visited on the same day by different teams, this results implies that there is
mixing between teams and that catching teams can indeed connect multiple farms.
Conversely, for slaughterhouses, only 24% of visits were to single premises, implying that the
event that a slaughterhouse vehicle visited more than one premises on a single day was much
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Figure S5. Number of catching company teams associated with poultry premises.
less rare. This occurs due to the lower number of slaughterhouses (compared to catching
teams) associated with the Catching Company. Furthermore, when more than one poultry
premises was visited by a slaughterhouse vehicle, Additional File 1 Figure S4 shows that up
to 26 movements (to different premises) were made in one day. This implies that, even when
frequency of movements are taken into account, slaughterhouse-related movements might be
frequent enough to cause an outbreak to reach multiple premises. Interestingly, Additional File
1 Figure S4 also shows that there is a bi-modal pattern in these data. There is a large peak at 2
movements per day and another smaller peak at 10 movements per day. This could be related
to the capacity of the slaughterhouses to handle birds. An explanation for this could be that
it is possible that larger slaughterhouses have the capacity to visit an average of 9 - 12 farms
per day, whereas the smaller ones (of which there may be more) can visit only two or three
premises per day. Visitng over 13 or 14 farms a day appears to be only occur in exceptional
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cases. Investigating this further could provide an area of further research.
Consistent with the data in the PND, although just over half of premises send birds to just
one slaughterhouse, some premises send birds to multiple slaughterhouses (up to six according
to data from the Catching Company and up to eight according to the PND). This may be a
result of slaughterhouses operating on a species-specific basis, so farms housing multiple species
send birds to multiple slaughterhouses. According to the movement data from the Catching
Company, premises using the Catching Company send birds to one or more of eight slaughter-
houses. Data collected from 96 slaughterhouses however, suggests that up to 35 slaughterhouses
are associated with the premises that use the Catching Company. This suggests that either
premises use multiple catching companies, or premises catch birds themselves and send to
multiple slaughterhouses. Due to the ability of slaughterhouses to connect a larger number
of premises than catching companies, it is important to determine which case is most likely.
Results from the static network analyses presented in [Dent et al., 2008] suggest that it is more
likely that premises use multiple slaughterhouses than they do multiple catching companies.
S1.3 Movement dependent on farm size
There is evidence to suggest that the probability that more than one farm is visited by a
catching team, in a day, is related to the size of the first farm visited.
Figures S6 and S7 show the empirical distributions of data describing whether or not an onward
movement was made (by catching teams) for different farms sizes (measured by the number of
houses (S6) and the number of birds (S7) on a farm).
The light grey peak in Additional File 1 Figure S6 shows that onward movements were most
likely to have occured after a medium sized farm had been visited (farms with 10-11 houses).
We would expect these farms to be operating in cycles, so that there are always birds on the
farms and only a small number of houses are visited per catching team visit. The dark grey
peak at farms of size 12-14 houses suggests that no onward movement was most likely to have
occured after large farms had been visited (however, there is only a slight difference in the
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Figure S6. Distribution of whether or not onward movements (dark grey, no onward movement and
light grey, onward movement) were made by a catching team, given the number of houses on the first
farm visited.
location of the light and dark grey peaks). These farms may be operating an all-in-all-out
procedure, where all birds are caught at once and sent to slaughter. There was another small
peak of onward movement from small farms (with 4-5 houses), implying that catching team
visits to small farms are likely to have resulted in the team visiting other premises on the same
day. When number of birds was used to determine farm size (Additional File 1 Figure S7), then
onward movement was still most likely to occur from medium to large farms (housing between
240,000 and 280,000) birds and no onward movement most likely from larger farms (housing
320,000 to 360,000 birds). The small-farm peak seen in Additional File 1 Figure S6 can also
be seen for onward movements from farms housing 40,000 to 80,000 birds. These results imply
that when catching teams visit more than one farm, they are most likely to have come from a
small to medium sized farm first. However, if they visit only one farm in a day, it is most likely
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Figure S7. Distribution of whether or not onward movements (dark grey, no onward movement and
light grey, onward movement) were made by a catching team, given the number of birds (in 1000s)
on the first farm visited.
that this farm is a large farm.
Similar conclusions however, cannot be drawn from the empirical distributions of data describ-
ing whether or not an onward movement was made by slaughterhouse vehicles and personnel.
Additional File 1 Figures S8 and S9 show the distribution of how often onward movements
occurred according to farm size (houses and number of birds), for movements made by slaugh-
terhouse vehicles and personnel. Additional File 1 Figure S8 shows that onward movements
were least likely to have occurred after visiting large farms (more than 7 houses) and most
likely to have occurred when the first farm visited has four or fewer houses. There is another
peak at farms with 7 houses, which occurs because there are two farms with 7 houses that are
frequently visited by vehicles from the same slaughterhouse. Although no onward movements
were most likely to have occurred when a farm with four houses was visited by a slaughterhouse
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Figure S8. Distribution of whether or not onward movements (dark grey, no onward movement and
light grey, onward movement) were made by a slaughterhouse vehicles, given the number of houses
on the first farm visited.
vehicle (dark grey peak in Additional File 1 Figure S8), patterns in the data are not evident.
When the distribution was replotted against the number of birds on a farm (Additional File
1 Figure S9), the data tell a different story. First of all, the data show that the first farm to
be visited by a slaughterhouse vehicle was almost always a small to medium farm (fewer than
200,000 birds). For this reason, if only one farm is visited is is likely to be small, if more than
one farm is visited, it is likely that a small farm was visited first. The data for farm size by
number of birds supports that of farm size by number of houses in that onward movements did
not occur in large farms. This could suggest that slaughterhouse vehicles require a long time
to load and transport birds from large farms, leaving no time (and perhaps no free equipment)
in the day for movement to other farms. Interestingly, no onward movement was most likely to
occur from farms housing 40,000 or fewer birds. This implies that all birds on these farms are
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Figure S9. Distribution of whether or not onward movements (dark grey, no onward movement and
light grey, onward movement) were made by slaughterhouse vehicles, given the number of birds (in
1000s) on the first farm visited.
taken to slaughter in one batch (i.e. they operate on an all-in-all-out basis and not in cycles).
For slightly larger farms (40,000 to 80,000 birds), onward movements were more likely to have
occurred, perhaps because these farms operate in cycles, so fewer birds are taken to slaughter
in one batch, allowing vehicles to collect birds from other farms in order to fill the truck. In
conclusion, the patterns of onward movements of slaughterhouse vehicles cannot easily be pre-
dicted from farm size, though the data do suggest that there is some prioritisation of the order
of visits, in that small farms are more likely than large farms to be visited at the beginning of
a day.
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S1.4 Repeated movements
Under the assumption that risk of infection is related to the frequency of visits, large premises
are at a higher risk of becoming infected via the movement of catching teams (and slaughter-
house vehicles).
According to the data, 51% of links between premises that are created by the movement of
catching teams were repeated at least once over the time period studied. Seventeen percent of
premises were only visited once in the data set. Approximately 1% of premises were visited over
200 times, with one premises being visited 370 times (one visit every 2 to 3 days). According
to the GBPR, this premises consists of seven houses of 36,000 broiler chicks per house, so if
the cycle in each house is one week apart and each house is visited separately, thinned (once
birds reach a certain size, a small proportion are removed, freeing up space for remaining birds
to grow bigger) and has part depopulation (not all houses are emptied of birds at the same
time, so that there are always birds present on the farm, and depopulation takes place over
a prolonged period of time), at different times, it is possible that the site is visited every few
days. Generally speaking, larger premises are visited more frequently than smaller premises.
Additional File 1 Figure S10 shows the distribution of the number of visits made by catching
teams, according to premises size. The Figure shows that large premises (>200,000 birds or
more than 10 houses) were visited more frequently, perhaps as a result of ‘thinning’ (over
100 visits in the time period (936 days), corresponding to visits made every 10 days or more
frequently). Interestingly, small and medium premises are less frequently visited (the majority
receiving fewer than 100 visits over the 936 day period). There could be several explanations for
this: such premises may be using multiple catching companies (or catching birds themselves) or
they may operate an all-in-all-out procedure as there are not enough birds on the farm to justify
a stratified production procedure. It is noted that other factors, such as biosecurity measures
employed by farm staff for example, may vary according to farm size. This is less relevant here
as the biosecurity measures employed by personnel associated with catching company are set
by the catching company rather than by the farm being visited.
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Figure S10. Distribution of number of catching team visits per premises for (a) premises size
defined by number of houses (red = 10 or more houses, green = 5 to 10 houses, blue = 0 - 5 houses)
and (b) premises size defined by number of birds (red = more than 200,000 birds, green = 100,000 -
200,000 birds, blue = 0 - 100,000 birds).
S1.5 Distance between associated premises
In an outbreak situation, surveillance and protection zones are set up at 10km and 3km, re-
spectively, around infected premises. If these zones are to be effective in controlling disease,
then movements between premises should be restricted to occurring within these zones. For
these data, the majority of premises are situated more than 3km (the current PZ put around
infected premises) from each other.
Additional File 1 Figure S11 shows the distribution of the number of premises located within
13
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 20
Number of premises
Pr
op
or
tio
n
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
Figure S11. Distribution of the number of premises located within 3km (dark grey) and 10km
(light grey) of each premises associated with the catching company.
3km (dark grey) and 10km (light grey) of each premises associated with the Catching Company.
The figure shows that almost 50% of premises have only one other premises located within 3km,
with no more than 5 premises located within 3km of each other. The figure also shows that
there are up to 20 premises (corresponding to approximately 5% of premises) located within
10km of each other. As only a maximum of 5% of premises are located within 10km of each
other, this implies that there may be many premises that are associated with the Catching
Company that would not be located within the surveillance zone of a (potentially) infected
poultry farm. In fact, for these data, approximately 16% of premises are located more than
10km away from all other premises. However, when GBPR premises are added to the data,
a total of 1987 additional premises are located within 3km of the studied premises and 9298
premises within 10km. We further note that a total of 504 GBPR premises are located within
500m of a premises associated with the catching company, suggesting that a limit of 500m for
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spatial spread (that is assumed in the simulation model) could still result in transmission via
this route.
When we consider the distance between premises that are linked by catching teams and the
distances travelled between premises and slaughterhouses, we see that the majority of linked
premises are further than 10km apart.
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Figure S12. Distribution of distances travelled for (a) catching teams between premises and (b)
from premises to slaughterhouse.
The movements of catching teams between premises and the movements made from premises
to slaughterhouse could cover long distances (Additional File 1 Figure S12), resulting in the
potential for geographically widespread dissemination of virus. Only 28% of catching team
movements were made between premises less than 10km apart (within the current SZ), with
some catching teams travelling very long distances between premises on the same day. The
increase in the proportion of movements that are greater 300km apart is caused by catching
teams visiting a single premises located in a more remote area of GB. The Euclidean distance
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travelled by slaughterhouse vehicles, from premises to slaughterhouse was also relatively long,
with a mean distance of 106.2km (with a large standard deviation of 73.15, implying diversity
in the data).
When road distance is considered as a measure for distance, there is little difference in the
results obtained.
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Figure S13. Comparison of road and Euclidean distances. Distribution of the number of premises
located between premises that are linked, according to Euclidean distance (dark grey) and road
distance (light grey).
Additional File 1 Figure S13 shows the distribution of the number of premises located between
two linked premises, counted using Euclidean distance and road distance to measure the distance
between linked premises. The figure shows that there is little difference between using road and
Euclidean distance to measure distance between linked premises, for these data. Road density
is high in the South and East of GB, compared to the North and West and, given that a high
proportion of premises associated with the Catching Company are located in the East of GB,
this might explain why there is little difference between road and Euclidean distance for these
data. Furthermore, the figure shows that most movements are made between premises that
are close to one another, with over 20% of links occurring from one premises to one of the five
16
closest neighbouring premises. These results thus suggest that the use of Euclidean distance as
a distance measure for these data is acceptable.
S1.6 Owner movements
In addition to these data, it was assumed that links could occur because of premises being
linked by poultry company i.e. poultry premises with the same owner. Owner movement
data were not available for analysis and were therefore simulated, based on expert opinion.
However, information about which poultry premises belong to which company was obtained
from a combination of the Catching Company data and the PND. Similar data were not available
for farms that were added to the dataset from the GBPR. This is highlighted as an area for
further study.
Of the 415 farms in the data set, 114 were associated with a multi-site poultry company. There
were 10 multi-site companies associated with the Catching Company, the largest of which
contains 43 of the poultry premises associated with the Catching Company. The number of
links per node via owner (representing the mean degree) for these data is 24 premises. The
owner network clearly represents only a small proportion of the 415 farms that use the Catching
Company and so we might expect that transmission via this route is not likely to be the most
influential to the model results. It is also noted that there is no overlap between companies, so
each poultry farm can only be associated with one poultry company.
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S2 Additional File 2 - Simulation modelling: methods.
The simulation model, written in C language, is designed to simulate the spread of avian
influenza virus between a sample of premises in Great Britain (GB). Virus is spread via the
movements of catching teams, slaughterhouse vehicles or personnel, company personnel or by
limited airborne spread.
The simulation can be broken down into a number of steps as shown in Additional File 2 Figure
S1, summarised by Additional File 2 Algorithms S1 to S5.
Figure S1. Programme design for AIV simulation.
S2.1 Simulation model: input data
Input data are read in to the programme as a series of text files as described in Additional File
2 Table S1. Movement data of catching teams (CC) and slaughterhouse vehicles (SH) were
obtained for a period of 936 days, for a sample of 415 farms in GB. These farms will be referred
to as ‘network’ farms. Movements of farm personnel between premises and local spread are
simulated based on expert opinion. Data for poultry farms located within 15km of network
farms are collected from the GB poultry register and included in the simulation in order to
allow for virus to spread outside the network of farms for which we have movement data.
Table S1. Input data for AIV simulation (GB)
File name Size (cols x rows) Description
Link index Number link types x
Number farms in net-
work*
Number of farms con-
nected to each farm by
each link type.
Continued on next page
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Table S1 – continued from previous page
File name Size (cols x rows) Description
GBPRlocal15 5 x Number farms in
study region (within
15km of network
farms)
Farm input data:
farm number, farm ID
(from Defra database
- not required), east-
ing, northing, size
(birds).
GBPR local15 flocks 6 x Number flocks**
in region studied
Flock input data:
farm number, flock
number, easting,
northing, size (birds),
species type.
Nwork SZ10 19 x Number Farms in
network
Vector of network
farms within 10km of
each network farm.
Nwork SZ10index 1 x Number Farms in
network
Number of network
farms within 10km of
each network farm.
flockprem GBPR Nwork 1 x Number flocks Which farm each flock
is in.
flocksinprem GBPR Nwork 1 x Number farms Number flocks on each
farm.
Premtoflock GBPR Nwork 23 x Number Farms Vector of flocks that
are on each farm.
own links 2 x Number of links One link per row:
Farm A, Farm B.
Events CC 7 x Number catching
company events
List of farms visited
by each catching team
per day. One team per
day per row.
Width CC 1 x Number catching
company events
Number farms visited
per day per team.
Row number cor-
responds to row in
Events CC.
Date CC 1 x Number catching
company events
Day of catching team
event. Day 1 = start-
ing date. Row number
corresponds to row in
Events CC.
Continued on next page
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Table S1 – continued from previous page
File name Size (cols x rows) Description
Time CC 4 x Number days Day number; number
CC events for that
day; 1st CC event, last
CC event. CC event
= row number from
Events CC.
Events SH 7 x Number catching
company events
List of farms visited
by each catching team
per day. One team per
day per row.
Width SH 1 x Number catching
company events
Number farms visited
per day per team.
Row number cor-
responds to row in
Events CC.
Date SH 1 x Number catching
company events
Day of catching team
event. Day 1 = start-
ing date. Row number
corresponds to row in
Events CC.
Time SH 4 x Number days Day number; number
CC events for that
day; 1st CC event, last
CC event. CC event
= row number from
Events CC.
Non Nwork SZ10 5 x Number non-
network farms within
10km of network
farms
Row ID, Farm num-
ber, farm ID, easting,
northing.
*Network farms refer to farms in the study region for which movement data
are available, or simulated. **Flocks: we assume that all birds of the same
species and purpose (eg layer chickens or meat chickens) are kept together
on a farm and we therefore refer to them as a single flock, so a farm that
houses ducks, broiler chickens and layer chickens will be recorded as a farm
of three flocks.
The movement data are then transformed into an array with dimensions as shown below. The
array describes the exact order of events per flock per day, these data are combined with
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information about the potential links that may occur due to premises belonging to the same
integrated company and the distance between the premises. Each entry in array[0], array[1]
and array[2] is a flock ID number, the entries in array[3] are distances (m) corresponding to
links in array[2]:
array[0][][] =(Number network premises)∗(Number days in data)∗(number CC visits per premises
per day)
array[1][][] =(Number network premises)∗(Number days in data)∗(number SH visits per premises
per day)
array[2][] =(Number network premises)∗(Number premises in same integrated company)
array[3][] =(Number network premises)∗(Distance between premises linked by integrated com-
pany)
S2.2 Simulation model: set parameters
Parameters are set in the programme as shown in Additional File 2 Table S2.
Table S2. Parameters (inc. matrices) used in simulation model
Parameter Description/comments
Number iterations 100
Run time Number of days to run model for = 50 days
Random number Pseudo random number generator, using real time
as seed
Random farm Farm chosen at random, on which to seed infection
Random time Day, chosen at random, on which to seed infection
Max Dist Maximum distance between infected farms
Species type Type of species in flock
Species prob Probability of a given species being visited varies
according to species, based on the number of
each flock type visited, where data were available
chicken = 0.71, ducks/geese = 0.16, Turkeys =
0.12, other = 0.01 (2dp).
Continued on next page
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Table S2 – continued from previous page
Parameter Description/comments
Probability of transmission
via local (airborne) trans-
mission given by distance
kernel
Probability of transmission between two farms
within a certain distance of each other is based on
a distance kernel described by Boender (2007) in
analysis of geographical spread of infectious dis-
eases (see section A-1.5, equation 1). Maximum
transmission set to 0.01 at zero meters (ie. be-
tween flocks on same farm). Maximum distance
over which airborne spread can occur = 500m.
Probability of transmission
(via farm personnel, catch-
ing team, slaughterhouse
vehicle)
Transmission rates between premises are currently
unknown so they are varied between 0 and 0.2 in
a stepwise fashion, with an extra parameter value
added at 0.001. This results in 22 parameter values
per potential transmission route.
Time to detection Number of days between infection and detection
(at farm level). It is assumed that detection occurs
within 6 days of infection, with a 2-day latent pe-
riod, described by a triangular distribution based
on mean time to detection of 4 days to estimate
time to detection for premises outside a PZ/SZ
and mean time to detection of 3 days inside these
zones. Time to detection is the same for all species
apart from ducks, where we add 15 days on the es-
timated time to detection.
Time to culling 3 days after detection outside PZ/SZ, 2 days after
detection in SZ and 1 day after detection in PZ.
Based on Defra report from outbreak in GB 2007.
Probability of staff working
on multiple farms
Expert opinion. Dependent on farm size and
species as described previously. We assume small
premises are more likely to share staff. Assume
premises only share staff within 35km radius.
Probability of area manager
visit
Expert opinion (discussed below). Fewer visits ex-
pected to layer farms.
Probability of vet visit Expert opinion (discussed below).
Infected Farm List List of premises infected during outbreak
Infection Time Day premises becomes infected
Detection Time Day infected premises are detected
Culling Dates Day infected premises are culled
Farm Inf Infectious state of a premises (susceptible (0) in-
fected (1), detected (2), culled (-1))
Proportion positive Proportion outbreaks that result in spread beyond
the seed premises, for each parameter set.
Continued on next page
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Table S2 – continued from previous page
Parameter Description/comments
SZ Matrix Premises in surveillance and protection zones
S2.3 Simulation model: infect 1st flock
For 100 simulations of each combination of transmission parameters, the random number gen-
erator chooses a premises in the network to infect and a time to infect the premises from day
zero to day 886 (total number of days minus number of days epidemic is left to run for). If the
premises is visited within 15 days of infection, then the programme chooses a flock on the seed
premises to infect, based on the species type, where known, such that chickens are the most
likely to be infected (as they are the most likely to be visited by the catching company). If the
premises is visited within 15 days of infection, transmission can occur via movement of catch-
ing teams and slaughterhouse vehicles. Otherwise, transmission is restricted to local spread or
spread via company personnel movements (see Additional File 2 Algorithm S1). The infectious
state of the first premises is set to 1 and the model enters the ‘transmit disease’ stage, where
it first transmits infection via movements and then via local spread.
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Algorithm S1: AIV MAIN FUNCTION(pseudocode)
for transmisison probabilities (CC, SH, own)← 0 to 0.2
do


for iterations← 1 to 100
do


choose a random farm to visit
choose a random time to start infection
for time← t to t+50
do if farm visited within 15 days of start time
then


choose a flock to infect based on species type
set detection dates for 1st infected farm
set culling dates for 1st infected farm
Transmit AIV as in Alg. A-5
Transmit AIV via local spread as below
comment:Update SZ and PZ
for number farms← 1 to Number newly infected farms
do
{
find all farms within 10km and label as in SZ
find all farms within 3km and label in PZ
comment:Do detection and culling of infected farms
for infected farms← 1 to total number infected farms
do


if Detection Time of Infected Farm = t
then update status to detected
if Culling Dates of Infected Farm = t
then update status to culled
output data
S2.4 Simulation model: spread AIV via movements
Movements of catching teams and slaughterhouse vehicles are determined entirely by the real-
time movement data, this means that infection via these transmission routes is independent of
farm type and dependent only on the movement between an infected and susceptible premises
taking place. Catching team movements always precede slaughterhouse vehicle movements.
Spread of infection between premises belonging to the same integrated company, or via spatial
transmission are determined stochastically, based on species type and farm size and simulated
after infectious movements via catching team and slaughterhouse have occurred. Additional
File 2 Algorithm S2 gives pseudocode for the spread of AIV via movements.
7



Algorithm S2: AIV VIA MOVEMENTS(pseudocode)
for time(days)← 1 to 50
do


for Farms← 1 to Number of infected farms
do


for farm visited by CC← 1 to No. visits in 1 day
do if farm is already detected/frozen/culled
then break
else if infected farm is not yet detected
then Infect via movements (Alg. A-3 to A-5)
S2.5 Catching company and slaughterhouse movements
Once a poultry farm has been infected at random, the programme runs for 50 days (this
time was chosen as in test runs of the programme, no epidemic exceeded 50 days under the
assumptions made), infecting, detecting and culling premises as follows (shown in Additional
File 2 Algorithm S3).
Assuming the seed premises (premises i) is visited by a catching team (and hence a slaugh-
terhouse vehicle) within 15 days of seed infection (day j), then the programme accesses the
appropriate place in the links array (see above). For the ith premises, on the jth day, the links
array gives a list of all premises that are visited after the ith premises. Given that AIV has an
incubation period of only several hours, it is assumed that birds are able to spread disease from
the point that they become infected, so that all premises visited after the seed premises becomes
infected and on the same day, are susceptible to transmission of disease. Before transmitting
disease to susceptible premises, the programme checks that the susceptible premises is in fact
susceptible (by checking infectious state of the premises = 0). The programme then checks that
the premises does not have any restrictions placed on it (ie is not in a PZ or SZ) and, assuming
there are no movement restrictions, proceeds by infecting a flock on the susceptible premises
with a probability equal to the probability of transmission via catching company movements
(varied between 0 and 0.2). Where the number of flocks on the premises is greater than one, one
or more flocks are chosen to be infected according to the probabilities highlighted in Additional
File 2 Table S2. A premises is infected when one or more flocks on the premises is infected. If
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a premises is visited multiple times in one day, then it is potentially connected to more than
one infected premises and the probability of infection is given by Equation (1).
P (i gets infected) = 1− (
∏
j (1− pj)),
for j infected premises and p probability of infection for each contact.
(1)
As soon as a premises is infected, the infectious status of the premises is updated and the
premises ID added to the list of infected premises. Detection and culling dates are set (though
detection and culling occur at the end of each time step) for each newly infected farm.
This process is then repeated for slaughterhouse-linked movements.




Algorithm S3: TRANSMIT AIV VIA CC/SH(pseudocode)
for susceptible farm← 1st farm visited to last farm visited
do


count number of flocks and number of duck flocks
if susceptible farm has not been frozen
then


choose a flock to be visited by CC
for susceptible flock← 1 to number flocks on farm
do


infect using random number generator
if random num < transmisison probability
then


infect flock
note change in flock status
update farm status to infected
if flock is ducks
then make special note
note number of new infections, and date of new infection
comment: set detection time of newly infected farms
comment: if not in PZ or SZ, time to detect is slower
if farm is neither in SZ or PZ
then


use time to detection function: expected = 4days
if only ducks are infected
then add 5 days to detection time
Set culling date to detection date + 3days
else if farm is in SZ/PZ
then


expected time to detection reduced to 4 days
if only ducks are infected
then add 5 days to detection time
Set culling date to detection date + 2/1 days (SZ/PZ)
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S2.6 Company personnel movement
The programme then moves on to transmission of disease via company-related movements (re-
ferred to as owner movements), as shown in the pseudocode in Additional File 2 Algorithm S4.
These movements are simulated in the programme, based on expert opinion from P. Mcmullin
(Poultry Health Services, UK). For each infectious premises, the programme determines if the
premises is, on each day, sharing staff, according to the probability of staff working on multiple
premises as shown in Additional File 2 Table S3
Table S3. Probability of premises share staff, according to premises size (number birds on premises)
Probability of staff working
on multiple premises (de-
pendent on farm size)
0.45 (<50,000 birds)
0.1 (50,000 to 200,000 birds)
0 (>200,000 birds)
Frequency of vet visits Every 50 days
Frequency of manager visits Every 10 days (non-layer
farms)
Every 50 days (layer farms)
If staff shares are found to occur on an infected premises, the programme uses the links array
to search for other premises in the same company, within a 35km radius, which can also have a
staff share and determines, with the probabilities given in Additional File 2 Table S3, if these
premises are also sharing staff on each day of the simulation. If there exists two premises within
the same company that are within this region and both ‘sharing staff’, then we assume that
there is a link between the premises and the second premises is classed as susceptible. We also
assume that there is a small probability, based on whether or not a premises houses laying
hens (Additional File 2 Table S3), that a vet or an area manager will visit an infected premises
on each day of the simulation. If this occurs, susceptible farms within the same company are
searched for and also visited by the vet or area manager with the same small probability, creating
a link between infected and susceptible farms. The programme then infects susceptible farms
in a similar way as with catching team and slaughterhouse-related movements; first confirming
the infectious status of susceptible premises and then infecting a flock according to species type
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and setting detection and culling dates for all newly infected premises.
Once infection has occurred via movements, the programme uses the input file, ‘Nwork SZ10’
(Additional File 2 Table S1), to create 10km surveillance zones (SZ) and 3km protection
zones (PZ) around infected premises (refer to Additional File 2 Algorithm S1) and writes these
premises to the ‘SZmatrix’ array (Additional File 2 Table S2). The date at which susceptible
premises enter and leave these zones is set so that movement can be frozen within these zones if
desired. The programme then adds GBPR premises to the SZ and PZ in preparation for local
spread.




Algorithm S4: TRANSMIT AIV VIA OWNER(pseudocode)
for infected flock← 1 to total number infected flocks
do

assign staffshare probability, based on farm size
determine if layer flock or not
assign probability of manager visit
for susceptible farms← 1 to Number farms in company
do


if manager visit occurs on infected and susceptible farms
then


assume link between infected and susceptible farms
if random num < transmisison proability for owner
then


infect a flock according to species
note change in flock status
update farm status to infected
if flock is ducks
then make special note
repeat for vet visits
if staff sharing on both farms and distance close enough
then


assume link between infected and susceptible farms
if random num < transmisison proability for owner
then


infect a flock according to species
note change in flock status
update farm status to infected
if flock is ducks
then make special note
note number of new infections, and date of new infection
set detection time of newly infected farms as in Alg. A-3
set culling dates as in Alg. A-3
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S2.7 Local spread
Irrespective of infectious status, local (airborne) spread can occur between all premises within
a predefined distance, as shown in Additional File 2 Algorithm S5.




Algorithm S5: AIV LOCAL TRANSMISSION(pseudocode)
for flocks← 1 to number infected flocks
do


find all susceptible flocks within 0.5km
if random num < transmission probability∗
((
1− dist
0.5
)2)2
then


infect susceptible flock
note change in flock status
update farm status to infected
note date and number of new infections
set detection time of newly infected farms as above
set culling dates as above
As a result of particulate (though not necessarily still infectious) material being detected 500m
from poultry houses in the H7N7 outbreak in the Netherlands [D. Alexander, pers. comm.],
expert opinion was that spatial (primarily airborne) spread in GB is likely to occur with small
probability and only for distances up to a maximum 0.5km [D. Alexander and R. Irvine, pers.
comm.]. By assuming that the distance between flocks on the same farm is zero, this allows for
between-species spread on multi-species farms and some spatial spread between separate farms.
Between-species transmission is important on multi-species sites as it may allow for disease to
spread into different industry sectors, which may otherwise not be connected. Based on expert
opinion and a density kernel described in [Boender et al., 2007], it is assumed that spatial
transmission could occur at a maximum probability of 0.01, up to 0.5km from the infected
premises, before detection of disease. This resulted in the probability distribution described in
Equation (2) and shown in Additional File 2 Figure S2. The use of this kernel means that the
probability of infection via local spread between flocks on the same premises is greater than
transmission between flocks on neighbouring premises, as would be likely if, for example, same
premises implies greater proximity, or if local spread is actually mediated by human activity,
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such as movement of workers on the same premises and poor biosecurity.
p (transmission|dist (km)) =


0.01
((
1− dist
0.5
)2)2
dist (km) < 0.5km
0 otherwise
(2)
Figure S2. Transmission kernel corresponding to Equation (2), for distances ranging from 0 to
0.5km. The kernel equates to zero for distances larger than 0.5km.
For the list of infected premises, susceptible (ie in this case not culled) premises are found using
the ‘GBPR local15 flocks’ file (Additional File 2 Table S1). We assume that local spread can
occur between flocks on the same premises as well as between premises. There is no within
flock spread in the model. Detection and culling dates are set for newly infected premises.
S2.8 Detection and culling
The probability of detection on a daily basis, following infection, will vary according to species,
housing type, virus dose and virus strain [Yoon et al., 2005]. Detection (and culling) dates
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are set at the same time that a premises becomes infected, dependent on the species infected.
The time to detection is given by a triangular distribution, based on mean latent period from
the literature [Savill et al., 2008,Sharkey et al., 2008,Stegeman et al., 2004] (Additional File 2
Table S2). For all infected premises, if the infected flock is known to be a duck or goose flock,
then the time to detection is increased by 15 days. If multiple flocks are infected, then the time
to detection of a premises is equal to the shortest time to detection of all infected flocks on the
premises. Premises that are within the PZ or SZ are detected more quickly than those outside
these zones (see Table S2). Using the time taken to cull birds in the most recent outbreak
of HPAI H5N1 in GB, it is assumed that culling occurs 3 days after detection of an infected
premises, reduced to 2 days if the premises is in a SZ and 1 day if it is in a PZ. Once infection
has been spread via different routes, detection and culling begins such that for all infected
premises, if the detection or culling dates are the same as the current date, the status of the
farm is updated (to 2 (detected) or −1 (culled) in ‘Farm Inf’). The number of new infections is
noted at the end of each day (Additional File 2 Algorithm S1). It is assumed throughout that
premises that have been culled are no longer involved in the outbreak. There is no re-housing
of culled premises in this model.
The time step is increased by one day and the above processes are repeated on the list of
infected premises, up to day 50 and for all transmission parameter combinations.
S2.9 Outputs
Once infection has ceased, the programme records a list of all premises involved in the outbreak.
This includes premises that have been infected, detected and culled, as well as premises in the SZ
and PZ. The maximum distance between infected premises is calculated as well as mean number
of infected premises over all iterations for each combination of transmission probabilities.
Four output files are created.
(i) inf prems step.txt: a list of premises infected, the dates that they have been infected,
detected and culled, for each simulation.
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(ii) PSZSstep.txt: a list of premises included in the PZ and SZ, the dates that they entered
the zones for the first time and the date they expect to be removed, for each simulation.
(iii) results step.txt: the seed farm, the transmission probabilities used, the total epidemic
size and the maximum distance between infected premises for each simulation and for
each parameter set.
(iv) Output step.txt: for each parameter set the mean epidemic size, the proportion of seed in-
fections resulting in secondary spread, the largest epidemic simulated (number of premises
infected), longest distance between infected premises within largest epidemic, the longest
distance between infected premises over all simulations and the number of premises in-
cluded in the epidemic that is the most widespread are recorded.
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S3 Additional File 3 - Sensitivity to spatial spread
As there is no evidence of airborne spread in any outbreak in GB to inform the model [D.
Alexander, pers. comm.], the sensitivity of the simulation model to the assumption that local
spread can occur up to 500m was investigated and the results compared for all transmission
parameters set to 0.2 (Additional File 3 Table S1). When HPAI was able to spread up to 3km, as
seen in parts of the Netherlands in 2002 [Boender et al., 2007], the number of times infection left
the network for which movement data were available was more than three times larger for 3km
(7.4%) than for 500m (2.4%). There seems to be no significant difference in the number of times
infection went beyond the seed premises, for all scenarios. This implies that the probability
of infection beyond the seed premises is more heavily dependent on other transmission routes
than local spread. An increase of local spread from 500m to 3km was also sufficient to increase
both the mean and maximum epidemic size. This highlights the importance of being able to
accurately predict the probability of local spread between premises.
Table S1. The impact of assumptions regarding the maximum distance for local spread on the
simulated outbreak size for an avian influenza virus in Great Britain.
Local
spread
limit
Epidemic size Percentage out-
breaks resulting
in
Mean number
premises
Mean Max Onward
spread
Spread
outside
system
In PZ In SZ
0km 2.12 12 21% 0% 124 18
0.5km 1.54 10 20% 2% 78 10
3km 2.53 22 25% 7% 107 15
1
Bibliography
[Boender et al., 2007] Boender, G., Hagenaars, T., Bouma, A., Nodelijk, G., Elbers, A.,
de Jong, M., and van Boven, M. (2007). Risk maps for the spread of highly pathogenic
avian influenza in poultry. PLoS Comput Biol, 3(4):e71.
2
S4 Additional File 4 - Results - supplementary tables
Table S1. Binary logistic regression: secondary spread versus transmission rates for interaction
between transmission routes at different levels of transmission.
Category Level odds ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% p-value
cc 1 1.06 0.86 1.31 0.556
2 1.04 0.85 1.29 0.699
3 1.11 0.90 1.37 0.325
own 1 1.06 0.85 1.32 0.625
2 1.65 1.32 2.05 0.00
3 2.06 1.66 2.56 0.00
sh 1 0.82 0.67 1.00 0.05
2 0.89 0.73 1.08 0.243
3 0.96 0.79 1.17 0.694
cc*own 1*1 0.95 0.80 1.12 0.526
1*2 0.93 0.79 1.10 0.423
1*3 0.93 0.79 1.10 0.393
2*1 0.98 0.83 1.16 0.808
2*2 0.95 0.80 1.13 0.573
2*3 0.94 0.80 1.11 0.490
3*1 0.93 0.78 1.10 0.396
3*2 0.88 0.74 1.04 0.126
3*3 0.87 0.74 1.03 0.100
cc*sh 1*1 0.97 0.85 1.12 0.688
1*2 0.99 0.86 1.14 0.916
1*3 0.97 0.84 1.11 0.651
2*1 0.99 0.86 1.14 0.870
2*2 1.00 0.87 1.15 0.967
2*3 0.96 0.83 1.10 0.534
3*1 0.98 0.86 1.13 0.831
3*2 1.01 0.88 1.16 0.871
3*3 0.97 0.84 1.11 0.635
own*sh 1*1 1.28 1.09 1.50 0.003
1*2 1.25 1.07 1.47 0.006
1*3 1.25 1.07 1.47 0.006
2*1 1.23 1.05 1.44 0.012
2*2 1.16 0.99 1.36 0.061
2*3 1.15 0.98 1.34 0.089
3*1 1.25 1.07 1.47 0.005
3*2 1.19 1.01 1.39 0.033
3*3 1.16 0.99 1.36 0.058
Level 1 = low transmission rate 0 - 0.06, level 2 = medium transmission rate 0.07 - 0.13, level
3 = high transmission rate 0.14 - 0.2. cc= catching company, sh = slaughterhouse, own =
company personnel.
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Table S2. Binary logistic regression: small outbreaks versus catching company transmission rates.
Transmission rate Odds ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% p-value
0.001 0.97 0.93 1.00 0.064
0.01 1.00 0.97 1.04 0.820
0.02 0.95 0.92 0.98 0.005
0.03 0.97 0.94 1.01 0.153
0.04 1.02 0.98 1.06 0.303
0.05 0.96 0.93 0.99 0.024
0.06 0.96 0.93 1.00 0.044
0.07 0.99 0.95 1.02 0.451
0.08 0.96 0.93 1.00 0.037
0.09 0.95 0.92 0.99 0.011
0.10 0.97 0.94 1.01 0.109
0.11 0.98 0.94 1.01 0.230
0.12 0.99 0.96 1.03 0.697
0.13 1.00 0.97 1.04 0.971
0.14 0.98 0.94 1.01 0.172
0.15 0.98 0.94 1.01 0.241
0.16 0.96 0.92 0.99 0.016
0.17 1.00 0.96 1.03 0.807
0.18 0.98 0.95 1.02 0.313
0.19 0.96 0.93 1.00 0.045
0.20 0.98 0.95 1.02 0.373
Table S3. Binary logistic regression: small outbreaks versus owner transmission rates.
Transmission rate Odds ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% p-value
0.001 0.98 0.94 1.03 0.488
0.01 1.09 1.04 1.14 0.000
0.02 1.19 1.14 1.25 0.000
0.03 1.27 1.22 1.33 0.000
0.04 1.38 1.33 1.44 0.000
0.05 1.42 1.37 1.48 0.000
0.06 1.47 1.41 1.54 0.000
0.07 1.53 1.47 1.59 0.000
0.08 1.66 1.59 1.73 0.000
0.09 1.74 1.67 1.81 0.000
0.10 1.76 1.69 1.83 0.000
0.11 1.86 1.79 1.94 0.000
0.12 1.97 1.89 2.05 0.000
0.13 1.94 1.87 2.02 0.000
0.14 2.11 2.03 2.19 0.000
0.15 2.09 2.01 2.17 0.000
0.16 2.19 2.11 2.28 0.000
0.17 2.24 2.16 2.33 0.000
0.18 2.34 2.25 2.43 0.000
0.19 2.38 2.29 2.48 0.000
0.20 2.38 2.29 2.48 0.000
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Table S4. Binary logistic regression: small outbreaks versus slaughterhouse transmission rates.
Transmission rate Odds ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% p-value
0.001 0.97 0.94 1.01 0.101
0.01 0.99 0.95 1.02 0.446
0.02 0.99 0.96 1.03 0.623
0.03 1.00 0.96 1.03 0.883
0.04 1.00 0.96 1.03 0.846
0.05 1.00 0.96 1.03 0.897
0.06 1.04 1.00 1.08 0.037
0.07 1.03 1.00 1.07 0.068
0.08 1.04 1.01 1.08 0.022
0.09 1.04 1.01 1.08 0.021
0.10 1.05 1.01 1.08 0.014
0.11 1.07 1.03 1.11 0.000
0.12 1.05 1.01 1.09 0.010
0.13 1.09 1.05 1.13 0.000
0.14 1.08 1.04 1.12 0.000
0.15 1.09 1.05 1.13 0.000
0.16 1.07 1.04 1.11 0.000
0.17 1.08 1.04 1.12 0.000
0.18 1.09 1.05 1.13 0.000
0.19 1.09 1.05 1.13 0.000
0.20 1.10 1.06 1.14 0.000
Table S5. Binary logistic regression: large outbreaks versus catching company transmission rates.
Transmission rate Odds ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% p-value
0.001 1.00 0.43 2.31 0.999
0.01 1.09 0.48 2.47 0.836
0.02 1.09 0.48 2.47 0.836
0.03 0.54 0.20 1.47 0.232
0.04 1.00 0.43 2.31 0.999
0.05 0.91 0.39 2.14 0.826
0.06 0.91 0.39 2.14 0.826
0.07 1.00 0.43 2.31 0.999
0.08 1.09 0.48 2.47 0.836
0.09 1.00 0.43 2.31 0.999
0.10 1.64 0.77 3.46 0.199
0.11 1.00 0.43 2.31 0.999
0.12 0.73 0.29 1.81 0.492
0.13 1.82 0.87 3.79 0.112
0.14 1.45 0.67 3.13 0.339
0.15 1.64 0.77 3.46 0.199
0.16 1.36 0.63 2.97 0.435
0.17 1.82 0.87 3.79 0.112
0.18 1.00 0.43 2.31 0.999
0.19 1.18 0.53 2.64 0.685
0.20 0.73 0.29 1.81 0.492
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Table S6. Binary logistic regression: large outbreaks versus owner transmission rates.
Transmission rate Odds ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% p-value
0.001 1.00 0.45 2.23 0.999
0.01 0.58 0.23 1.48 0.256
0.02 0.58 0.23 1.48 0.256
0.03 0.67 0.27 1.63 0.374
0.04 1.08 0.49 2.37 0.843
0.05 0.92 0.40 2.08 0.834
0.06 0.92 0.40 2.08 0.834
0.07 0.83 0.36 1.93 0.669
0.08 1.00 0.45 2.23 0.999
0.09 1.33 0.63 2.82 0.452
0.10 1.25 0.58 2.67 0.565
0.11 1.00 0.45 2.23 0.999
0.12 1.58 0.77 3.26 0.213
0.13 1.17 0.54 2.52 0.696
0.14 0.83 0.36 1.93 0.669
0.15 1.83 0.91 3.70 0.091
0.16 0.92 0.40 2.08 0.834
0.17 0.92 0.40 2.08 0.834
0.18 1.08 0.49 2.37 0.843
0.19 1.08 0.49 2.37 0.843
0.20 1.33 0.63 2.82 0.452
Table S7. Binary logistic regression: large outbreaks versus slaughterhouse transmission rates.
Transmission rate Odds ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% p-value
0.001 0.00 0.00 na 0.996
0.01 0.50 0.09 2.73 0.422
0.02 0.00 0.00 na 0.996
0.03 0.25 0.03 2.23 0.214
0.04 0.25 0.03 2.23 0.214
0.05 2.00 0.60 6.63 0.259
0.06 1.25 0.34 4.65 0.741
0.07 1.00 0.25 3.99 0.998
0.08 2.50 0.78 7.96 0.122
0.09 2.25 0.69 7.29 0.178
0.10 2.25 0.69 7.29 0.178
0.11 3.00 0.97 9.29 0.057
0.12 3.49 1.15 10.62 0.027
0.13 3.00 0.97 9.29 0.057
0.14 3.25 1.06 9.95 0.04
0.15 5.49 1.89 15.94 0.002
0.16 6.49 2.27 18.60 0.000
0.17 6.99 2.45 19.94 0.000
0.18 6.24 2.17 17.94 0.001
0.19 10.24 3.67 28.59 0.000
0.20 7.24 2.55 20.60 0.000
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S5 Additional File 5 - Maximum distance between in-
fected premises.
The results of the maximum distance between infected premises are displayed in Additional
File 5 Figure S1
Figure S1. Histogram of maximum distance between infected premises for all outbreaks that
spread beyond the seed premises
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